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Soft Law in EU Competition Law and its Judicial Reception in 
Member States: A Theoretical Perspective 
 






This work draws from accounts on the nature and legal effects of soft law instruments in 
EU and international law with the ultimate aim to construct a theoretical framework for 
recognition of EU competition soft law—guidelines, communications, notices, and the 
like—in the judicial discourse of national courts of the European Union. “Recognition” is 
used to encompass instances in which the national judiciary either explicitly interprets—
that is, agrees or disagrees with—the content of competition soft instruments, or treats 
their substance in a roundabout, implicit way—without explicit reference to soft law in the 
judgment proper. This second option is called “the persuaded judiciary scenario.”
1
 
Importantly, a foundational assumption of the current work is that courts do not transform 




This Article also takes issue with the fact that CJEU preliminary rulings on competition soft 
law disputes originating in Member States have thus far exhibited a rather resistant 
attitude to soft law. The supranational judiciary has, to a large extent, refused to interpret
3
 
soft law because of its lack of binding force. The possibility that national courts adopt a 
                                            
* Zlatina Georgieva (LLM) is a doctoral candidate with the Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg 
University Law School, the Netherlands. The objective of her PhD thesis is to research the manner in which the 
national judiciary of select EU Member States engages with Commission-issued competition soft law. The author 
would like to thank Prof. Pierre Larouche, Dr. Agnieszka Janczuk-Gorywoda, and Jan Broulik (LLM) for their 
valuable comments on previous versions of this Article. A word of sincere gratitude also goes to the editorial team 
of the German Law Journal. 
1 Sabine Saurugger & Fabien Terpan, Resistance to EU Soft Law: A Typology of Instruments 24–25 (May 9, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (developing a similar typology to account for resistance to, and 
not recognition of, soft law). 
2 See infra Section B.II (elaborating on this view proposed by Oana Stefan); OANA STEFAN, SOFT LAW IN COURT: 
COMPETITION LAW, STATE AID AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 142 (2012).  
3 The only institution that is bound by competition soft law is the European Commission. See Dansk Rorindustri v. 
Comm’n, CJEU Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, 2005 E.C.R. I-
05425, paras. 209–11 (holding that the European Commission binds its own discretion when issuing latter 
instruments). Thus, in accordance with formal legal doctrine, unless the Commission is party to a dispute involving 
soft law, soft instruments cannot be deemed to produce binding effects. 
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similar approach in the currently decentralized competition enforcement system is thus 
not discounted, but is seen as undesirable for two important reasons. 
 
First, this Article argues that judicial recognition of competition soft law at the national 
level is not only necessary, but also needed in order to determine the currently uncertain 
legal position of subjects of the de-centralized competition regime (National Competition 
Authorities—NCAs) and, importantly enough, natural and legal persons affected by anti-
competitive practices. Second, judicial recognition is greatly needed in order to legitimate 
the substantive analytical framework—the so-called “more economic” approach to 
competition law sealed in soft law instruments—and thus prevent the possibility of 
divergent judicial interpretations across the different EU Member States. 
 
More specifically, due to the increased importance of soft law in the decentralized EU 
competition enforcement system, one could argue that the discrepancy between the 
practical effects that it produces and its concomitant, but largely unrecognized, legal 
effects creates a quandary with regard to the rights and obligations of the actors in the 
system.
4 
This issue is rooted in the high likelihood that the detailed and sometimes 
imperative content of EU competition soft law is taken at “face value” by both natural and 
legal persons who adjust their behavior to soft law,
5
 only to realize that conformity does 
not protect them if faced with an anti-competitive challenge. The national judiciary is 
highly unlikely to engage with soft law in such a situation because those scenarios involve 
atypical instruments of law that lack any legally binding force and, allegedly,
6
 cannot affect 




Indirectly, national judicial resistance to soft law could also create uncertainty for the 
NCAs. Because the latter are bound by Commission decisions which should incorporate the 
more economic reasoning of the guidelines, NCAs are most likely also going to adopt a 
more economic reasoning. Conversely, national courts could stray away from the 
guidelines because more economic soft law is not necessarily aligned with the case law of 
the supranational courts, which jurisprudence national courts are obliged to follow. If this 
scenario comes to fruition, NCA decisions would not be upheld on appeal. 
 
                                            
4 G.M. Borchardt & K.C. Wellens, Soft Law in European Community Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 267, 270 (1989). 
5 Id. at 313. 
6 See id. at 321 (“In so far as Community soft law intends to cause legal consequences with regard to the 
individual these rules of conduct are particularly eligible for an appeal for annulment or a preliminary ruling.”).  
7 See infra Section C (discussing this point in greater detail); id. at 312 (“Soft law does create an expectation that 
conduct of states, international organizations and the individual will be in conformity with the non-binding rules 
of conduct. In this regard it is correct to speak of ‘commitments’ (legal) and ‘expectations’ (legal).”).  
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The above-envisioned scenarios pose a serious problem from a rule-of-law perspective and 
the principle of legal certainty in particular, which postulates that “those subject to the law 
must know what the law is so as to be able to plan their actions accordingly.”
8
 Taking the 
principle of legal certainty as a theoretical point of departure, this Article argues that 
competition soft law should be recognized judicially in national courts. This recognition 
should be achieved through adoption of a flexible view on law, as opposed to a 
formalist/positivist view, that rejects all judicial engagement with soft law.  
 
In order to discuss the intricate issue of judicial recognition of soft law, this Article uses 
terminology developed by Senden
9
 that inventories the different legal guises of soft law. 
Namely, a distinction is made between (1) incidental binding force, and (2) indirect legal 
effects that a soft law instrument can produce.
10
 The former term refers to attribution of 
formal legally binding force to a soft law instrument by virtue of its internal “particular or 
specific merits,”
11
 while the latter relates to the external dimension of soft law, or the 
possibility of its validation by the subjects of the law and legal authorities. In this sense: 
 
[T]he legal effect does not ensue directly from the 
nature of the act itself, but indirectly from the 
operation of other legal methods and principles . . . 
such indirect legal effects can occur as a result of 
interpretation [in light of primary or secondary EU law] 




Because, as Senden establishes, it is quite unlikely for a true soft law act to have incidental 
binding force (unless it is ultra vires), this Article concentrates on the second option for 
judicial recognition of soft law: Indirect legal effects. Thus, when the “nature” of a soft law 
act is referenced in Section B.III below, it does not claim the existence of an incidental 
binding force because this is unattainable for a true soft law act, like competition soft law. 
The nature of soft law should therefore be seen as a discussion of soft law’s internal 
                                            
8 See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 163 (1999); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 43 (2009) 
(“From the perspective of those who are subject to law’s constraints, the gains from marginal improvements in 
the law are rarely sufficient to outweigh the losses that would come from being unable to rely even on imperfect 
legal rules and imperfect precedents.”).  
9 LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (ITS RELATIONSHIP TO LEGISLATION) 265 (2004). 
10 See id. (noting that those two terms are, in turn, opposed to inherent binding force—the classical stipulation 
that a hard law act is binding by virtue of the intent of the legislator). 
11 Here, “merits” should be understood as: Drafter’s intention (wording, context, and history), possibility of the 
act to produce novel legal effects not contained in underlying primary or secondary law, legal basis of the act, 
institutional competence to adopt in conformity with legal basis, and lack or presence of agreement between 
parties to the act. See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 292–305. 
12 Id. at 267. 
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features that could contribute to it generating indirect legal effects, and not as an 
incidental binding force. 
 
With this information in mind, the current Article proceeds by acquainting the reader with 
competition soft instruments and introduces the main theoretical stances on the nature, 
discussed in Section B, and legal effects, discussed in Section C, of soft law—the factors 
that determine judicial engagement with soft instruments. Lastly, taking into account 
CJEU’s case law and literature based off of judicial responses to new governance, Section D 
of this Article proposes several theoretical possibilities for the national judiciary to 
recognize competition soft instruments. 
 
B. Soft Law: A Single Concept with Multiple Dimensions 
 
This section will conduct an inquiry into the nature of soft law in the EU Competition 
domain against the backdrop of theoretical insights on the nature of soft law generated 
within the fields of international and European law.
13 
Such an approach is useful because it 
has the potential to bring out the specificities of competition soft instruments by 
juxtaposing them with instruments that exist in two related domains and bear the same 
name. But before engaging in this task, due attention will be paid to the transformation of 
law thesis originating in international law that alleges the inability of soft law to exist as a 
self-standing instrument of law. It is important to examine—and refute—this theory first 
because if soft law cannot have a legal existence on its own, a discussion of its legal nature 
is not necessary. 
 
I. Soft Law in EU Competition Law—Setting the Scene 
 
Soft law instruments have been prominent in the field of EU Competition Law since the 
inception of regulatory activity in the late 1950s. They are issued unilaterally by the 
European Commission and are devoid of a legally binding force—namely, they do not 
constitute valid binding law. Article 17.1 TEU authorizes the Commission to produce soft 
law and stipulates that “[t]he Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union 
and take appropriate initiatives to that end . . . it shall exercise coordinating, executive and 
management functions, as laid down in the Treaties.”
14
 The wording of this provision 
                                            
13 Soft law is also used at member state level in the form of, among others, clarifying circulars issued to 
administrative authorities by the government. The national setting, however, is not considered in this paper 
because soft law operates differently in the supra-, national, and international contexts. See David Trubek, Patrick 
Cottrell & Mark Nance, Soft Law, Hard Law, and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity 1, 3 (Univ. of 
Wis. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 1002, 2005) (presenting a similar compartmentalization approach).  
14 See Hakon Cosma & Richard Whish, Soft Law in the Field of EU Competition Policy, 14 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 25, 50 
(2003) (contending that Art. 17.1 TEU is the legal basis for adoption of competition soft law); Dirk Lehmkuhl, On 
Government, Governance and Judicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy, 28 INT’L PUB. POL’Y 139, 
150 (2008). Note that Art. 17.1 TEU (ex. Art. 211 EC) has become even vaguer as to the powers of the Commission 
after the revision it underwent with the Lisbon Treaty. 
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leaves the Commission a considerable amount of discretion to develop policy. The notices, 
guidelines, and communications drafted in the field provide “interpretation and 
application of the existing body of . . . law.”
15 
Thus, via soft law, the Commission aims to 
summarize and clarify its own decisional practice, as well as that of the European Courts, 
without prejudicing the case law of neither national nor supranational courts. In this sense, 
soft law in the competition domain has traditionally served as a complement and 
clarification to already existing law.  
 
However, certain instruments of soft law extend beyond the traditional by introducing 
novel elements to the established practice.
16
 Most of these instruments also contain 
imperative, compelling language which, combined with the increasing importance of 
competition soft law as self-standing rather than merely auxiliary instruments,
17
 have 





These concerns were augmented during the competition policy reform of 2004,
19
 which 
decentralized the enforcement regime and made Article 101.3 TFEU, on permissible 
justifications for otherwise anti-competitive conduct, directly applicable. In effect, both 
national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts can now conduct 
full competition analysis. Commission-initiated guidance in the form of competition soft 
law supposedly diminishes the threat to consistent enforcement resulting from this new 
multi-level, multi-actor setting. This makes soft law indispensable for national enforcers, 
especially where formal Commission decisions do not sufficiently inform national 
decisional practice. The high level of detail in those instruments also increases their 
perceived reliability and, despite being formally non-binding, they may create expectations 
in legal persons (businesses) that this Article argues should be addressed
20
 by national 
courts of law,
 
notwithstanding supranational judicial resistance thereof.  
 
                                            
15 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 160. 
16 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission—Notice—Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 8 (“[T]he Commission also intends to explain its policy with regard to issues that have 
not been dealt with in the case law, or that are subject to interpretation.”).  
17 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 21 (acknowledging that although soft law is not a new phenomenon, its “proposed 
use as an alternative to legislation is new”).  
18 Linda Senden, Soft Law and its Implications for Institutional Balance in the EC, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 79, 93 (2005). 
19 See Council Regulation 1/2003, 2002 O.J.  (L 4) 1 (changing the EU Competition Law regime both substantively 
and procedurally on 1 May 2004). 
20 See Eleanor Sharpston, Legitimate Expectations and Economic Reality, 15 EUR. L. REV. 103, 104 (1990) 
(expressing this same view). 
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Thus, competition soft law portrays an intriguing dichotomy. While attempting to provide 
democratic values such as clarity, certainty, and participation,
21
 competition soft law in an 
increasingly complex policy setup
22
 simultaneously erodes those same values because of 
its non-justiciability.  
 
This curious contradiction can be explained if one looks at its theoretical embedding—the 
conflict between a flexible and a formalist/positivist view of law. While formalists assert 
non-binding instruments’ lack of justiciability largely due to their non-democratic adoption 
process,
23
 proponents of a more flexible view put forward the phenomenon of “legal 
legitimacy”
24
 that accounts for the legalization of non-legal norms.  Authors with a flexible 
viewpoint acknowledge that for law to be legitimate, it should go beyond, but not 
disregard, positivist requirements for internal validity of the law—form, forum, and 
content
25
—and secure “agents in the system understanding why rules are necessary.”
26
 
Importantly, it is submitted that “[p]articipating in constructing law enhances agents’ 
understanding of its necessity . . . adherence to specific legal rationality that all participants 
understand and accept helps to legitimate the collective construction of the law.”
27
 In this 
regard, the flexible view of law marries the formal requirements on the nature and internal 
validity of the law with a more fluid understanding of its external validity and legitimization 
by legal subjects. Thus, under a flexible view of law, the internal dimension of a soft 
                                            
21 The term “participation” here refers to the public consultations that the Commission holds before issuing 
competition soft instruments. 
22 Clarity and certainty here should only be understood as practical clarity and certainty. When it comes to legal 
certainty, contrary to Commission claims that it is enhanced by soft law, soft law creates greater uncertainty for 
the subjects of the law whose expectations might be induced by soft law, but are subsequently non-defensible in 
court since soft law lacks legal status. 
23 See, e.g., Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4 (analyzing from a quite formalist viewpoint); SENDEN, supra note 9 
(presenting a doctrinal thesis from a similarly formalistic perspective). But see STEFAN, supra note 2 (adopting a 
more flexible approach to law).  
24 See Martha Finnemore & Stephen Toope, Alternatives to Legalization: Richer Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT’L 
ORG. 743, 749 (2001)  
Under a broader view of law, the legalization of politics encompasses 
more than just the largely technical and formal criteria of obligation, 
precision, and delegation. It encompasses features and effects of 
legitimacy, including the need for congruence between law and 
underlying social practice. It attends to the purposive construction of 
law within inherited traditions, the way participating in law's 
construction contributes to legitimacy and obligation, and to the 
continuum of legality from informal to more formal norms. 
25 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 298. 
26 See Finnemore & Toope, supra note 24, at 749. 
27 Id. 
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instrument is governed by formal requirements whereas, externally, application of a 
flexible set of norms
28
 allows the judiciary to recognize the legal subjects’ perception of 
soft law as legitimate. This enables soft law to produce legal effects without acquiring 
incidental binding force. 
 
Focusing these insights on the case of competition soft law, it is likely that, due to its 
detailed language and other persuasive internal characteristics, subjects of the current 
competition regime have experienced and perceived competition soft law as legitimate 
law. In the words of Schauer, “[T]hey have internalized it,”
29
 and have consequently 
created expectations that the enforcement regime should meet. This could potentially 
occur through active involvement with soft law by the national judiciary, which, by use of 
general principles of law and other techniques proposed in Section D below, could endow 
the instruments with two important features: (1) The ability, by producing legal effects, to 
serve legitimate expectations and thus contribute to legal certainty; and (2) The ability to 
create uniformity through cross-border judicial and administrative
30
 dialogue in the sphere 
of EU competition law. 
 
On a more general level, the formalist-flexible divide evokes a fundamental question on 
the meaning of democracy in an international context. A stream of innovative scholarship 
claims that expert technocratic, rather than representative democracy, is the way forward 
for polities such as the EU that exhibit non-hierarchical, multi-actor, and multi-level 
methods of policymaking.
31
 Soft law, as a primary product of the latter processes, is 
therefore capable of functioning as a full-fledged instrument of law.
32 
On the other 
extreme, traditional views on representative democracy as a system that secures checks 
and balances cannot see soft law as anything but auxiliary, legally non-binding, and 
                                            
28 See infra Sections C & D (delineating the concept of “flexible norms” further). 
29 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 121 (1991) (“[A]n agent has an internal point of view with respect to a 
rule when that agent treats a rule’s existence as relevant to the question of what to do.”).  
30 See Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which do not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 
101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, COM (2014) 4136 final [hereinafter De Minimis 
Notice] (providing a recent example of the administration (the European Commission) engaging the judiciary in a 
dialogue on the substance of soft law). The question now is whether the CJEU could explicitly engage with a 
Commission soft law instrument in its discourse.  
31 Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?, in GOOD 
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 289 (Christian Joerges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002). 
32 See Charles Sabel & William Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN 
THE EU AND US 395 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); see also Neil Walker, EU Constitutionalism and 
New Governance, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US 15 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); 
Grainne De Burca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US 1 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Mark Dawson, Soft Law and the Rule 
of Law in the European Union: Revision or Redundancy?, in LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL  
SOCIAL FIELD 221 (Bruno de Witte & Antoine Vauchez eds., 2013). 
2 3 0  G e r m a n  L a w  J o u r n a l   Vol. 16 No. 02 
informal. While the debate over the existence of a changing model of possibility of 
supranational democracy is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the 
above-described doctrinal divisions also underlie the prominent dispute regarding whether 




The matter ultimately boils down to the question of whether a legal system—the EU legal 
system in this case—can accommodate soft law as a legal, and not merely political, 
phenomenon. Additionally, under the assumption that the accommodation option exists, 
the question that arises is how precisely soft law can be accommodated. Answers to these 
questions will certainly diverge per policy.
34
 This Article focuses on the recently opened 
multi-level governance (hereinafter MLG) competition domain. The field’s current 
exposure to multi-level processes presents novel opportunities for fitting soft law into legal 
discourse. To this end, it is hereby maintained that national courts, as ultimate instances of 
normative ordering within EU Member States,
35
 will play an important role in shaping 




With these considerations in mind, this Article’s end goal is the exploration of theoretical 
possibilities for judicial recognition of competition soft instruments at the national level. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to get acquainted with theoretical debates on the 
internal nature and external legal dimension of soft instruments. 
 
II. International Law, EU Competition Law, and the Transformation of Law Thesis  
 
According to Borchardt and Wellens, authors of one of the foundational works on the 
subject, the concept of soft law rose to prominence in public international law in the 1970s 
when it became obvious that the exhaustive list of international law instruments 
enumerated in Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice could not 




                                            
33 See infra Section B.II. 
34 See Trubek, Cottrell & Nance, supra note 13, at 3. 
35 Michelle Everson, The Crisis of Indeterminacy: An Equitable Law of Deliberative European Market 
Administration?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET, supra note 31, at 231, 234.  
36 See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 566–67 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of courts in MLG settings); see also Mark 
Dawson, Transforming into What? New Governance in the EU and the Managerial Sensibility in Modern Law, 2 
WIS. L. REV. 389, 411 (2010) (stressing the weight of courts in MLG settings as well).  
37 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 267. 
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With regard to the legal dimension of international soft law, the authors emphasize the 
centrality of states’ intention to be bound as a basic tenet of hard legal obligations and 
contend that, because intention to be bound is lacking with regard to soft law,  
 
[s]oft law will not be capable of being used as a lever in 
order to remove [the] necessary, doctrinal distinction 
between international law and international politics, or 
to make it redundant. Indeed, this would lead to a 
juridification of international relations because of its 




This contention suggests that the authors see international soft law in a legally formalist 
fashion, as simply an expression of a political commitment. At the other end of the legal-
political divide stands hard law with no intermediate (quasi-legal) forms in-between.
39
 Jan 
Klabbers also subscribes to this black-and-white view, stating that an approach mixing law 
and politics would be quite disastrous because “once political and moral concerns are 
allowed to creep back into the law, the law loses its relative autonomy from politics or 
morality.”
40
 In a different work, Klabbers opines, in line with the formalist view on soft law 
suggested by Borchardt and Wellens, that when international tribunals interpret soft 









 while acknowledging the ability of soft norms to transition 
into hard ones, opine that soft law has legal merits in and of itself and does not necessarily 
need to be transformed into hard law when interpreted judicially. Chinkin also considers 
the desirability of a possible transformation process, stating that,  
                                            
38 Id. at 270. The importance of intended agreement between parties as a determinant of legal obligation of an 
instrument materializes in the EU Competition Law domain too as will be argued below. See infra Section B.III.  
39 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 271 (discussing soft law as signifying the “inadequate maturity of a 
particular rule of law” or as a phenomenon with pre-legal or para-legal character, which can thus reach the level 
of a hard obligation if re-negotiated); id. (acknowledging that in a court of law, a soft rule can be transformed into 
hard law if it forms the ratio decidendi of the judges’ reasoning). 
40 Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 381, 391 (1998). 
41 Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 167, 177 (1996). But see Jan Klabbers, 
Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in International Law, 70 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 403, 412 (2001) 
(“A strong argument can be made that to speak of ‘political bindingness’ versus ‘legal bindingness’ is not all that 
meaningful, as there might not exist such a neat separation between law and politics.”).  
42 Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 447 (2000).  
43 Cristine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 
850, 856 (1989). 
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Lawyers have a tendency to favor the legal norm and 
see this claim as desirable but the outcome of any such 
conclusion must also be considered. If a principle is, or 
becomes, a legal norm certain legal consequences 
follow from its performance and its breach. If claims 
that soft law principles have become hard law are to be 
accepted, it must be possible both to determine breach 




Indeed, the establishment of breach can be problematic in international economic law 
because its subjects are companies and individuals, whose behavior is not subject to 




The situation is different under EU economic law and competition law in particular. 
Because the primary provisions establishing the EU competition regime target private 
action on the market, there is no doubt that the rights and obligations created are aimed 
towards companies and individuals. In this context, the ability to establish breach—or to 
resort to any other traditional legal category—is present, and thus the transformation of 
soft into hard law becomes more plausible. This fact may explain why the transformation 





In the specific context of EU competition law, Oana Stefan gives the most in-depth account 
on the matter.
47 
The scholar presents a strong argument against the transformation thesis. 
Embedded in the discourse of multi-level governance in the EU
48
 and taking a more flexible 
view on law, Stefan claims that EU courts do not allow soft law to become hard. To that 
end, the judiciary employs refined mechanisms that give legal effect to soft law without 
                                            
44 Id. at 859. 
45 Id. at 858. 
46 See Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques, 56 MOD. L. REV. 19, 33 (1993) (providing supporting views of the transformation thesis); Albert 
Graells, Soft Law and the Private Enforcement of the EU Competition Rules, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 1 (2010) (supplying additional support for this thesis). But see OANA 
STEFAN, SOFT LAW IN COURT: COMPETITION LAW, STATE AID AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 142 (2012) 
(stating opposition to the transformation thesis). 
47 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 142–54. 
48 See David Trubek & Louise Trubek, The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity 
or Rivalry?, in ANNUAL MEETING OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 1 (2005); Trubek, Cottrell & 
Nance, supra note 13, at 4; David Trubek & Louise Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation (Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 1047, 2007). 
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endowing it with binding force.
49
 More specifically, she claims that through the 
intermediate use of general principles of law—legitimate expectations, legal certainty, and 
equality—courts allow soft instruments to produce legal effects in the system without 
turning them into hard law.
50
 The scholar explains the plausibility of this theoretical claim 
with the conceptual division between incidental binding force and indirect legal effects 
addressed previously in this Article. She also supports her views with empirical examples.  
 
Stefan’s flexible perspective on competition soft law and its interpretation by EU courts 
gives EU relevance to Chinkin’s observations on international economic soft law. Chinkin is 
hesitant to support the formalist transformation of soft law thesis and stipulates that the 
very specificity of some international soft law instruments gives them sui generis value and 
makes them more likely to be effective in controlling the respective domains to which they 
apply, which speaks for their non-transitory character.
51
 She also acknowledges that, due 
to the large variety of soft instruments in the international economic domain, it is 
undesirable to coin rigid criteria for determining their legal status. Consequently, she 
advocates an approach whereby each case is evaluated on its own merits. “The effects of 
entering into a binding or non-binding instrument are not restricted to the international 
arena and full contextual analysis is needed to resolve claims as to the outcome of 
becoming party to such an instrument.”
52
 At the same time, the author does acknowledge 





The theoretical model of Stefan is more sophisticated than what Chinkin’s work suggests 
because it actually explains how formal legal categories (for example, general principles of 
law), can be used to mediate the creation of legal effects for a flexible legal category such 
as soft law. While this function will be addressed in depth in what follows, it should be 
emphasized here that the battle between fluidity and rigidity in the law is an imminent 
trade-off that figures prominently in international and EU economic regulation.
54
 In fast-
paced, constantly evolving domains, flexibility and effectiveness are needed. A possible 
                                            
49 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 142–54. 
50 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 352–71 (making the same contention). 
51 But see Finnemore & Toope, supra note 24, at 748 (“Increased precision could lead to less obligation, when 
prospective members of legal regimes are driven away by fears of detailed rules that are inflexible.”). 
52
 See Chinkin, supra note 43, at 864. 
53 Id. at 865. 
54 See Daniel Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication 1 (Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal 
Studies, Working Paper No. 162, 2006) (discussing the cyclical ebbs and flows of certainty and fluidity); Arthur 
Vanderbilt, The Modernization of the Law, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 433, 433 (1951) (providing a more philosophical 
account).  
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means to secure them is through the use of soft, rather than hard, regulatory 
instruments.
55
 At the same time, the actors in the system require assurance of their ability 
to conduct business transactions in an environment of legal certainty—a demand 
conducive to the adoption of hard forms of law. The strength of Stefan’s thesis in this 
setting is that it manages to bridge a gap between two polar stances, which is why the 
latter theory is used as the basis of an attempt to construct a framework for judicial 
recognition of EU competition soft law at national level in the last section of this Article. 
 




 have explored the nature of soft law in the international and 
EU law domains. These scholarly works begin by delineating the constituent parts of a hard 
legal obligation and assert that soft law emerges when one or more of the elements 
constituting a hard obligation are not present. 
 
One of the more detailed works on the subject is that of Borchardt and Wellens, who 
assert that the differences with regard to the ingredients of a hard legal obligation in the 
international realm and EU law realms are minimal.
57
 For both domains, the authors argue 
that the publication and place of publication of an instrument have an influence on its legal 
nature.
58 
Additionally, Borchardt and Wellens maintain that the forum (institutional setting 
at adoption), content (wording), and form (legal form) in which instruments are adopted 
determine their “distance to the Treaty,” which, in turn “will be important when assessing 





With that background, Borchardt and Wellens claim that, relating to the notion forum: The 
more the framework within which actors interact is institutionalized in Treaty Articles, the 
closer the linkage with the Treaty and the greater the possibility to adopt hard law.
60
 
Second, when discussing characteristics of content, the authors list—in descending order 
                                            
55 This rationale holds explanatory value for the reforms that the EU Competition Policy regime underwent with 
the introduction of Regulation 1/2003. It also explains the increased importance that the system has attributed to 
competition guidelines, notices, and the like ever since.  
56 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 267; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 42, at 421; Finnemore & Toope, 
supra note 24, at 743. 
57 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 280. 
58 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa v. Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, CJEU Case C-410/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-03853 
(providing a recent example of the CJEU confirming this view). 
59 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 301. 
60 Id. at 301. 
2015 Soft Law in EU Competition Law 235 
             
in terms of ability to generate legal status—several settings, the first being “matters that 
are directly connected with the EEC Treaty and with respect to which the Community has 
exclusive competence.”
61 
This is precisely the situation of EU Competition Law. Judging on 
the basis of those two factors, it would appear that the EU Competition domain is more 
likely to be governed by hard rather than soft law.
62
 This conclusion remains unaltered by 
the third factor—form—because it is stated that the form of the instrument can give “a 
first indication to what extent parties intended a legally binding act,”
63 
but definitely not a 
final one.
64
 It thus appears that competition soft law is a theoretical impossibility.
65
 Such a 
conclusion is further warranted by the fact that non-compliance with competition norms 
usually entails sanctioning by the European Commission, sanctioning mechanisms being a 
further criterion determining the existence of hard legal obligation according to Borchard 
and Wellens. 
 
The analysis does not stop here, however, as Senden, Borchard, and Wellens testify.
66
 In 
order for an obligation to truly be a hard legal obligation, the adopting institution must 
possess the necessary competence for adoption established in the relevant legal basis of 
the act in question. This is the requirement on which competition soft law fails. Most 
guidelines are adopted on the basis of Article 17.1 TFEU—which the CJEU does not accept 
as a valid legal basis—or fail to mention an explicit legal basis. This warrants the conclusion 
that “the competence of the Commission will often be confined to the adoption of true, 
non-binding soft law acts.”
67  
 
                                            
61 Id. at 290.  
62 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 282–83  
[R]ecommendations are generally adopted by the Community 
institutions when the Treaty does not confer the power upon them to 
adopt binding measures. Where the power is actually provided for, 
the ‘danger’ lurks that an institution may in fact want to impose 
(new) legal rights and obligations by way of soft law acts. 
63 Id. at 290. 
64 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Informal Instruments Before the European Court of Justice, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 997, 
1016 (1994) (acknowledging that form is not definitive as to the legal nature of an instrument); SENDEN, supra note 
9, at 276; Usines à Tubes de la Sarre v. High Authority, CJEU Joined Cases C-1/57 & C-14/57, 1957 E.C.R. I-105 
(serving as the original CJEU decision on the matter).  
65 See Fabien Terpan, Soft Law in the European Union: The Changing Nature of EU Law 1 (Sci. Po Grenoble, 
Working Paper No. 7, 2013) (asserting that a transition to hard law by virtue of internal setup/validation/status is 
underway in this case). 
66 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 76; Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 280. 
67 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 306. 
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This fact has both positive and negative repercussions. On the positive side, the absence of 
valid legal bases saves competition soft law acts from the possibility of annulment for 
constituting illegal hard law in the clothing of soft law. The downside is that the absence of 
legally binding force does not preclude the instruments from producing effects on legal 
subjects. Namely, businesses that self-assess according to the framework of the new 
regime adjust their behavior on the substantive basis of soft law provisions. In a recent 
paper, Stefan observes that the legal situation of businesses may be affected by soft law.
68
 
More than twenty years before Stefan, Borchardt, and Wellens warned of this problem, 
maintaining that “[i]n so far as Community soft law intends to cause legal consequences 
with regard to the individual these rules of conduct are particularly eligible for an appeal 
for annulment or a preliminary ruling.”
69
 Nevertheless, as discussed above, competition 
soft law is unlikely to be subject to an action for annulment. Even if the latter were 
possible, it would still be an unfortunate result because the positive rule-clarifying role of 
soft law would be negated. This situation leaves a legal vacuum in the system difficult to 
bridge, especially at the national level where courts and administrative authorities now 
have full authority to enforce the Treaty competition law provisions. 
 
Further research into EU economic soft law and its ability to bind or produce legally 
binding effects revealed a curious phenomenon in the related to competition law area of 
state aids. In her article on soft law in the EU State Aid regime, Michelle Cini testifies to the 
fact that provisions of the soft Community Framework on State Aid to the Motor Vehicle 
Industry
70 
were converted into hard obligations via a negative Commission decision,
71
 the 
latter formalizing “what would have otherwise been an informal rule.”
72
 Indeed, state aid 
case law points to the fact that “there is a legal basis for the recognition of binding 
‘negotiated’ acts, which is linked to the specific duty of cooperation [of Article 108.1 
TFEU].”
73
 An incidental binding force of soft state aid acts can thus occur because state aid 
soft law is negotiated between the Commission and Member States, and there is a specific 
duty of cooperation between parties, stipulated in the legal basis of state aid soft law—
Article 108.1 TFEU.
74
 Such a phenomenon, incidental binding force based on agreement,
75
 
                                            
68 Oana Stefan, European Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide Between Legally Binding 
Force and Legal Effects, 75 MOD. L. REV. 879, 886. 
69 See Borchardt & Wellens, supra note 4, at 305 (noting that the statement should be read with the caveat that if 
firms voluntarily choose to comply with soft instruments, this fact need not entitle them to a legal remedy). 
70 Community Framework on State Aid to the Motor Vehicle Industry, 1997 O.J. (C 279) 97. 
71 Commission Decision 90/381, 1990 O.J. (L 188) 55. 
72 Michelle Cini, The Soft Law Approach: Commission Rule-Making in the EU’s State Aid Regime, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 
192, 202 (2001).  
73 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 298. 
74 CIRFS v. Comm’n, CJEU Case C-313/90, 1993 E.C.R. I-1125; Spain v. Comm’n, CJEU Case C-135/93, 1995 E.C.R. I-
1651; Ijsel Vliet Combinatie v. Minister van Economische Zaken, CJEU Case C-311/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-05023; Ger. v. 
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cannot be generated, however, with regard to competition soft law because the latter are 
not agreed upon instruments; the Commission issues them unilaterally. Also, there is no 
reference to general principles of law, such as cooperation, in the legal basis thereof. Still, 
as argued in the Introduction above, another legal mechanism—that of indirect legal 
effects—could be the alternative for competition soft law to acquire a legal dimension. 
 
The prospect of soft law producing legal effects via the intermediation of traditional legal 
categories such as general principles of law is of utmost importance for the safeguarding of 
the procedural and substantive consistency of the decentralized competition enforcement 
system. As demonstrated in this section, a strong case can be mounted in support of the 
independent legal existence and non-transitory nature of soft law, especially in an 
economic regulatory setting. Also, many of the internal characteristics of EU competition 
soft law instruments approximate them to hard law. In this sense, there is a mismatch 
between the outer shell of the instruments framed as non-binding and their quite 
compelling inner core,
76
 which explains why they are likely to produce expectations in the 
European competition enforcement regime. These expectations need to be addressed 
judicially. This can be accomplished through judicial recognition of the indirect legal effects 
of competition soft law. This Article turns to said legal mechanism next. 
 
C. Indirect Legal Effects of Soft Law 
 
The creation of indirect legal effects, or the ability of soft law to produce legal effects via 
the intermediary use of general principles of EU law, is a thesis purported in several 
scholarly accounts on soft law.
77
 It is also particularly popular with detractors of the 
“transformation of soft law” thesis because it explains how soft law could still produce 




Further qualification of the notion “general principles of law” is needed, because their 
substantive content matters with regard to their ability to induce legal effects of soft law. 
                                                                                                                
Comm’n, CJEU Case C-288/96, 2000 E.C.R. I-8237; Comm’n v. Luxembourg, CJEU Case C-69/05, 2006 E.C.R. I-
00007; STEFAN, supra note 2, at 176, 177; SENDEN, supra note 9, at 271, 304, 305. 
75 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 295 (coining this term). 
76 If we run competition soft law through the insights of Schauer, it also becomes clear that its compelling and 
quite detailed content might not be suitable for the context in which it operates. In policy domains that are 
subject to constant change in circumstances (i.e. electronic communications), it is better to create vaguer rules 
which are by default more adaptive to change and, in this sense, lend themselves to flexible, prospective decision-
making. Insofar as competition regulation is a field experiencing constant change, it needs to be governed by less 
heavy-weight rules in terms of content (and not only in terms of ‘soft’ law with hard content). See SCHAUER, supra 
note 8, at 195. 
77 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 142–54; SENDEN, supra note 9, at 267; Borchard & Wellens, supra note 4, at 288–89. 
78 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 22. 
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On the one hand, Takis Tridimas summarizes in his book the basic features of general 
principles of law by pointing out their pertinence to public law, their primary
79 
application 
to the relationship between the individual and the state, their origin in the laws of Member 
States, and their pre-existence of written law.
80
 On the other hand, general principles of 
law can also apply to purely private relations.
81
 In this light, it is not unthinkable that 
courts, especially national courts, could engage in interpretation of competition soft law on 
the basis of general principles of law. The plausibility of this option is further strengthened 
by scholarly accounts, which argue that, in order to acknowledge the values and views of 
individuals or self-appointed groups in a fluid supranational setting,
82
 courts should resort 
to ancient legal dogmas such as general principles of law. 
 
Such an act, paradoxically, could also give the competition regulatory system new life 
because general principles of law are formal tools of law employed when the rigid legal 
system requires change and flexibility. In this sense, they are the key to bridging the gap 
between formalism and flexibility, and thus to ensuring a lasting presence of competition 
soft law in judicial discourse.  
 
Furthermore, an important feature of general principles of law is that they do not carry 
normative content in and of themselves.
83 
This is why courts use them more as rules of 
interpretation than as self-standing rules. As Tridimas contends, “The importance of 
general principles cannot be assessed in the abstract but only by reference to results 




Senden argues that the principle of legitimate expectations—as a corollary of the principle 
of legal certainty—is not suitable for giving legal effect to soft law in the national domain 
because it does not have a direct connection with the drafter of the rules, the 
Commission.
85
 According to the latter author, these two principles only work in direct 
                                            
79 See TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 3 (specifying that general principles of law, because of their diverse application, 
can also be relied on by Member States and Community institutions). 
80 TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 3. 
81 Xavier Groussot & Hans Lidgard, Are There General Principles of Community Law Affecting Private Law?, in 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW IN A PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT 155, 163 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds., 2008). 
82 Michelle Everson, The Crisis of Indeterminacy: An Equitable Law of Deliberative European Market 
Administration?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET, supra note 31, at 231, 252. 
83 BERT VAN ROERMUND, LEGAL THOUGHT AND PHILOSOPHY: WHAT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IS ALL ABOUT 273 (2013). 
84 See TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 2. 
85 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 451. 
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claims against the Commission and form the basis of CJEU’s case law proclaiming that the 
institution binds its own discretion when issuing soft law.
86 
 
Senden recognizes, however, that the principle of legitimate expectations could also be 
invoked as a principle of national law in competition proceedings between two private 
parties. Because national authorities are obligated to apply national competition provisions 
and EU competition law in parallel,
87
 the national principle of legitimate expectations 
should also apply to the supranational soft competition legal framework. One could claim 
that because of decentralization, the ties between national and EU competition law—itself 
a domain of exclusive competence for the Union whereby Member States have fully 
transferred their sovereignty and thusly the traditions common to them
88
—have become 
stronger. Stronger in fact, even to the effect that general principles of EU law originally 
devised at the national level, such as legal certainty, should apply directly to Commission-
issued competition soft law in purely private competition disputes, without a formal 
community link requirement. 
 
Alternatively, the principle of community loyalty enunciated in Article 4.3 TEU could serve 
as a basis for giving legal effect to soft law in the national domain.
89
 However, some 
scholars believe that the latter principle enunciates too general an obligation that would 
not truly give effect to competition soft law in a national setting.
90
 An additional option 
considered by Oana Stefan is the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Stefan 
reasons that individuals could potentially rely on competition soft law provisions via the 
principle of equality because of competition soft law’s function “as a tool to foster formal 
equality and to ensure that in its discretion to enforce hard law the Commission does not 




                                            
86 Rorindustri v. Comm’n, CJEU Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, 
2005 E.C.R. I-05425. 
87 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 3, 2002 O.J. (L 4) 1 (creating this obligation). 
88 This is how general principles of law that stem from the legal systems of Member States are referred to. 
89 See SENDEN, supra note 9, at 309. 
90 See Stefan, supra note 68, at 892 (basing her conclusion on Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa v. Prezes Urzędu 
Komunikacji Elektronicznej, CJEU Case C-410/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-03853.  
91 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 209; Herwig Hofmann, Negotiated and Non-Negotiated Administrative Rulemaking: 
The Example of EC Competition Policy, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 153, 165 (2006) (providing another discussion on 
the principle of equality as a general principle of law that can endow competition administrative guidelines with 
legal effects). 
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A further possibility to invoke general principles of law in the competition domain is 
presented by Usher who sees the notion that competition should not be eliminated
92
 as a 
general principle of EU business law.
93
 The importance of freedom of economic activity as 
a foundational, base concern underlying EU law is further emphasized by the existence of a 
related right under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: The 
freedom to conduct a business.
94  
 
The remainder of this section will demonstrate how general principles of EU law and other 
legal mechanisms—namely, interpretation of soft law in light of the hard legislation to 
which it pertains—have been used by the CJEU to draw the boundaries of indirect legal 
effects of soft law. The foundation laid in this section will be used as the basis for the 
construction of a theoretical framework on the possibilities for judicial treatment of EU 




I. Indirect Legal Effects on the EU Commission 
 
EU courts—the CJEU and GC—have already held on several occasions that the Commission 
binds its own discretion by the adoption of soft law.
96
 It is precisely via general principles of 
law, particularly legitimate expectations and equal treatment, that soft law is deemed to 
produce a self-binding effect on the latter institution.
97
 In this regard, it is also important to 
acknowledge that a soft instrument can only produce an effect through legitimate 
expectations if its wording is sufficiently precise,
98
 as re-stated by the CJEU in Dansk 
Rørindustri: “It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain conditions and depending 





                                            
92 See, e.g., Commercial Solvents v. Comm’n, CJEU Case C-7/73, 1973 E.C.R. I-00223; Europemballage Corp. & 
Continental Can Co. v. Commission, CJEU Case C-6/72, 1973 E.C.R. I-00215 (asserting that competition in the 
internal market should not be eliminated). 
93 JOHN USHER, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 8 (1998). 
94 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, art. 16, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1. 
95 See infra Section D. 
96 Case 19/77, Miller Int’l Schallplatten GmbH v. Comm’n, 2 C.M.L.R. 334 (1978); Hercules Chemicals v. Comm’n, 
CJEU Case T-7/89, 1991 E.C.R. II-1711, paras. 53–54; Rorindustri v. Comm’n, CJEU Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-
202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, 2005 E.C.R. I-05425, paras. 209–11. 
97 Rorindustri, CJEU Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P at para. 211.  
98 Unie v. Comm’n, CJEU Case C-40/73, 1975 E.C.R. I-01663.  
99 Rorindustri, CJEU Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C-205/02 P to C-208/02 P and C-213/02 P, at para. 211. 
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Intent is an important element to the same effect. In Delimitis, AG van Gerven expounded 
on the legal status of the de minimis notice: 
 
Without wishing to express a view on the exact legal 
force of such a notice, which constitutes in any event a 
declaration of intention from which it is possible to 
deduce the Commission's policy on implementation 
and confers on the individuals for whom it is intended 
certain legitimate expectations, the national court may 
nevertheless find therein guidance as to how the 
Commission is applying Art. 85.1 [now Art. 101.1 TFEU], 




The above two elements are reminiscent of the criteria for legal nature of an instrument 
that are used in the international and EU domains.
101
 The presence of these elements in 
the discourse of the EU judiciary demonstrates that judges and advocate generals employ 
formalist analysis to the phenomenon of soft law. 
 
According to Stefan, and in keeping with the formalist tradition, the self-binding effect on 
the Commission has two main results: First, soft law could be used as a standard to assess 
the legality of Commission decisions; and second, soft law cannot be amended by 





II. Indirect Legal Effects on the Courts 
 
Senden argues that the effects of soft law on the European judiciary are limited to what 
she calls “voluntary interpretation aid.”
103
 In particular, she observes that the CJEU takes 
soft law into account either when it assists in the interpretation of the objective scope of 
hard law or, alternatively, when it aids in understanding the subjective intention of the 
legislature while adopting hard law.
104 
Analyzing this same aspect of soft law usage, 
Howells stipulates that it is precisely in this manner that soft law can influence the scope of 
                                            
100 Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, CJEU Case C-234/89, 1991 E.C.R. I-00935, para. 22. 
101 See supra Section B.III. 
102 See STEFAN, supra note 2, at 173–74. 
103 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 379–412. 
104 Similarly, in the international law context, Hillgenberg submits that non-treaty agreements, although 
technically non-enforceable, could produce legal consequences when taken into account for the purposes of 
interpreting a Treaty. See Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 (3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 499, 513–14 (1999). 
The same is submitted by KLABBERS, supra note 64, at 1012. 
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rights and obligations that arise from respective hard law.
105
 On a different note, Senden 
submits that EU courts are likely to consider soft instruments when they confirm prior 
points the judiciary has made with regard to the same subject. In this vein, Senden testifies 
that “where an interpretative act lacks . . . a basis in case law, there is less likelihood that 
the court’s interpretation will coincide with that of the Commission, as it has not yet 
committed itself to a certain interpretation.”
106  
 
As to the effect of soft law on the national judiciary, Senden explains that the latter has a 
duty of “mandatory interpretation” of EU soft law mandated to it by the case law of the 
CJEU.
107
 The authority establishing this relationship is the widely cited CJEU case Salvatore 
Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles (hereinafter Grimaldi),
108 
where the Court 
held that a “European schedule” of occupational diseases, a soft instrument annexed to 
another soft instrument, namely, a Commission recommendation, could not be binding 
due to lack of proper legal basis, but could certainly produce legal effects. Famously, the 
Court stated, “The national courts are bound to take recommendations into consideration 
in order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the 
interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement them or where they 
are designed to supplement binding Community provisions.”
109
 The last point made by the 
Court is important because this is the principle that it abides by. For instance, in the Lodato 
case,
110
 the judiciary dealt with the provisions of several guidelines, but also stated that the 
discussed terms of the soft instruments coincide with those of hard legislation, thus 
pointing to the conclusion that the treatment given to soft law was possible due to its 
textual closeness to the respective hard law provisions.
111
 
                                            
105 Geraint Howells, Soft Law in EC Consumer Law, in LAWMAKING IN THE EU, 329 (Craig and Harlow eds., 1998).  
106 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 390. The same idea is present in Liza Gormsen, Why the European Commission's 
Enforcement Priorities on Art. 82 EC Should Be Withdrawn, 31 (2) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 45, 49 (2010). Stefan 
also believes that, “In order to justify their position, courts ground soft law in judicial precedent.” STEFAN, supra 
note 2, at 181-98. 
107 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 402–07. Senden explains that, while earlier case law of the CJEU pointed towards the 
conclusion that soft law could be considered as nothing more than a voluntary interpretation aid for national 
courts, after Grimaldi and the subsequent Deutsche Shell (C–188/91 Deutsche Shell [1993] ECR I–5357) case, soft 
law should be used as a mandatory interpretation aid the national judiciary. 
108 Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds Des Maladies Professionnelles, CJEU Case C–322/88, 1989 E.C.R. 04407. 
109 Id. at para. 18. 
110 Lodato Gennaro & C. SpA v. Istituto Nazionale Della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) and SCCI, CJEU Case C–415/07, 
2009 E.C.R. I-02599. 
111 Id. In paragraph 28, the CJEU states completely out of context that a certain comparison term— the subject of 
the proceedings—that was originally contained in a guideline, is the same as the one adopted in a subsequent 
Regulation. The statement is out of context because earlier in the judgment in paragraph 22 the CJEU explicitly 
stated that there was no need for it to further discuss said Regulation because it was not adopted at the time of 
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The Grimaldi judgment has become a textbook example that sets the tone for the 
discussion on EU soft law, and the decision’s vague language contributes to varied 
scholarly responses.
112
 Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca, for instance, opine that “[a]ll 
binding forms of EU law are capable of direct effect, and while other types of non-binding 
law are not said to have direct effect, they are influential in other ways and may have what 
has become known as indirect effect.”
113
 But is this “indirect effect” the indirect effect of 
unimplemented Directives as expressed in Marleasing,
114
 or should it be conceptualized 
differently? Craig and de Búrca do not provide an answer, but Senden qualifies the legal 
effects that might ensue from soft law in the following manner: “[T]he fact that the 
community and national courts take account of soft law can also affect the rights and 
duties of individuals. Yet these effects do not go so far as to make soft law a standard that 
must be complied with as an end in itself.”
115
 Klabbers, however, adopts a more radical 
stance, contending that “[i]f legally non-binding provisions supplementing binding 
provisions must be taken into account, it follows that . . . those legally non-binding 
provisions must for all practical purposes be treated as legally binding.”
116 
Considering the 
generality of his claim and its possible applicability to several domains of EU regulatory 
activity, it is unfortunate that the author does not elaborate on how precisely this could 
happen and with which instruments of EU soft law.  
 
In light of the stance on the compelling legal nature of competition soft law developed 
above, this Article stands in between the views of Senden and Klabbers, asserting that 
competition soft instruments should be consistently followed in judicial discourse. They 
should become a standard that must be complied with as an end in and of itself.
117
 They 
should not, however, be treated as independently legally binding, but should produce 
indirect legal effects through the use of roundabout legal techniques and mechanisms. 
 
                                                                                                                
the dispute and was therefore immaterial to it. An explanation for the otherwise redundant paragraph 28, thus, 
would be the need of the court to somehow ground its soft-law-based arguments in hard law. 
112 For instance, see SENDEN, supra note 9, at 412; Klabbers, supra note 64, at 1014; GRAINNE DE BURCA AND PAUL 
CRAIG, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 190 (2011). 
113 GRAINNE DE BURCA AND PAUL CRAIG, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 190 (2011). 
114 Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, CJEU Case C–106/89, 1990 ECR I-04135. 
115 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 412. 
116 Klabbers, supra note 64, at 1014. 
117 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 412. 
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III. Indirect Legal Effects at the National Level  
 
The decisional practice of the Commission summarized in its soft instruments can 
produce legitimate expectations in natural and legal persons. This is evident in Austria 
v. Commission,
118
 where an un-communicated and unpublished national guide to State Aid 
affected Member States and interested parties on the basis of legitimate expectations.  
Specifically, according to Stefan, the decisional practice of the Commission described in the 




The opposite view was expressed by the CJEU in Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa (PTC),
120
 a 
competition law case. The question raised in this preliminary ruling was whether a National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) of a Member State could be precluded, through its 
administrative decisions, from referring to guidelines that have not yet been published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union in the language of the Member State in 
question. The underlying issue that the CJEU considered was whether these guidelines 
could give rise to third party rights and obligations because, if they did, they had to be 
subjected to translation in the native language of the Member State in question. The court 
held that the guidelines did not have to be published in the official native language for the 
administrative authorities to refer to them, thus indirectly confirming that soft law cannot 
give rise to rights and obligations for third parties. 
 
It is intriguing to contemplate the results of this decision in practice: Soft law cannot 
directly give rise to rights and obligations, but individualized decisions, which are 
eventually informed by the same soft law, undoubtedly affect the legal position of third 
parties (legal and natural persons). This is why Stefan rightly claims that the judgment 
presents a paradox: “[I]t shows how the purpose of ensuring, through soft law 
instruments, transparency and legal certainty in the enforcement of European law is 




The bottom-line of the above discussion is that the court came to opposite conclusions 
with regard to the ability of soft law to affect the legal obligations of third parties in two 
similar domains—state aid and competition law. This discrepancy exists because state aid 
guidelines result from compromise pursuant to Article 108.1 TFEU, which contains a 
                                            
118 Austria v. Commission, CJEU Case C–99/98, 2001 E.C.R. I-01101. 
119 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 181–98. 
120 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. v. Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej,CJEU Case C–410/09, 2011 
E.C.R. I-03853.  
121 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 885. 
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specific cooperation obligation among the Commission and Member States. This obligation 
is a specific enunciation of the more general principle of community loyalty of Article 4.3 
TEU, which is the principle of law that anchors state aid guidelines in the EU Treaty and 
generates their incidental binding force.
122 
No similar specific obligation exists in EU 
competition law, in which the Commission unilaterally issues soft law. Some have further 





An example from international law practice may be enlightening in the case of unilaterally 
issued competition soft instruments. Hillgenberg asserts that the principle of good faith, 
paired with legitimate expectations, justifies the legal dimension of a unilateral declaration 
made under international law.
124
 One could argue that within the EU context, it is precisely 
the principle of community loyalty that comes close to the substantive content of the good 
faith principle in international law.
125
 Thus, it is not unimaginable that Article 4.3 TEU, 
paired with the principle of legitimate expectations, could offer sufficient grounds for 




Nevertheless, it is difficult to give legal scope to competition soft law. This is further 
confirmed by more recent CJEU case law. It was unambiguously held by the Court in 
Pfleiderer
128
 that competition soft law was not binding on Member States.
129
 The same 
stance was subsequently taken in the Expedia case: “It also follows from the objectives 
pursued by the de minimis notice, as mentioned in paragraph 4 thereof, that it is not 
intended to be binding on the competition authorities and the courts of the Member 
                                            
122 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 189. See also, Emilia Korkea-Aho, What Is New About New Governance?, 32 RETFÆRD 
ARGANG 3 (2009). 
123 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 190. See also, Laurence Gormley, Some Further Reflections on the Development of 
General Principles of Law within Art. 10 EC, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT, 303 (Ulf 
Bernitz et al. eds., 2008). 
124 HILLGENBERG, supra note 104, at 506. 
125 For an illustration, see, infra Section D.I.1.b, the section on community loyalty. 
126 Raitio testifies that, “In EU law literature, the principle legal certainty has been linked with other general 
principles.” See Juha Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty as a General Principle of EU Law, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF EC LAW IN A PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT, 47 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds., 2008). For the concrete conditions under which 
the proposed combination could work, see, infra Section D. 
127 The possibility of pairing legitimate expectations and community loyalty to induce indirect legal effects of 
competition soft law will be explored in Section D, infra. 
128 Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, CJEU Case C-360/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-05161, paras. 21–24. 
129 Id. at paras. 21, 23. 
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States.”
130





 of the notice that were pointing to an impossibility of binding status. 
It was also claimed that “contrary to the Commission notice on cooperation within the 
network of competition authorities, the de minimis notice does not contain any reference 
to declarations by the competition authorities of the Member States that they 
acknowledge the principles set out therein and that they will abide by them,”
133
 which is a 
criterion reminiscent of the intended agreement rule as acknowledged in the EU State Aid 
domain discussed earlier. 
 
The Court’s ruling in Expedia regarding the legal status of soft law could be deemed 
disappointing from a flexible law perspective but legally sound from a formalist one. The 
de minimis notice, however, could not be considered absolutely ignored by the CJEU 
because the judiciary disagreed with the substance of the notice.
134
 Because disagreement 
minimally implies acknowledgment and recognition of the instrument at hand, it is by 
implication illogical to talk about any disregard thereof. The court was nevertheless 
cautious not to explicitly refer to the contents of the notice.
135
 The generality of its 
statement is apparent: “It must therefore be held that an agreement that may affect trade 
between Member States and that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its nature 
and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on 
competition.”
136
 This cryptic formulation relies on implied reasoning picked up by the 
Commission and translated into its revised de minimis notice
137
 as meaning that a practice 
that is shown to have anti-competitive object cannot be saved by the de minimis threshold, 
even if the abusing undertaking is slight enough to fall under that same threshold. 
 
It is intriguing to analyze this rather informal, but still significant, communication between 
Court and Commission in the Expedia case. The communication indicates that a subtle 
                                            
130 Expedia Inc. v. Autorité De La Concurrence and Others, CJEU Case C–226/11, para. 27 (Dec. 13, 2012), 
https://curia.europa.eu.  
131 Id. at para. 24. 
132 Id. at para. 30. 
133 Id. at para. 26. 
134 In order to take account of this substantive judicial disagreement, the Commission issued a new version of the 
de minimis notice in 2014 (O.J. 2014 C 4136) where paragraph 2 of the old de minimis notice (O.J. 2001 C 368) was 
replaced by the  holding of the CJEU in para. 37 of its Expedia judgment. 
135 Id. 
136 Expedia Inc., CJEU Case C–226/11 at para. 37. 
137 Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 198, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do 
Not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (De Minimis Notice), 2014 O.J. (C(2014) 4136 final). 
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judicial engagement with soft law—although negative—is becoming discernible at the 
supranational level and allows the judiciary to send signals about its attitude throughout 
the competition enforcement system. The Expedia case can thus be considered an initial 
indication that supranational courts have begun to recognize the substantive side of 
competition soft law. This fact may also soon be reflected in national judicial discourse. 
 
Whatever form of action, or lack thereof, vis-à-vis competition soft law the CJEU takes in 
the future, it will be of increased significance for national judicial practice. As AG Kokott 
acknowledged in her Expedia opinion: “The Court’s reply . . . will to a large extent 
determine the scope which the national competition authorities and courts will have in the 
future when applying Article 101 TFEU.”
138
 In that regard, the AG suggests the introduction 
of a requirement that national courts give reasons for deviation from soft law, a stricter 
requirement than the current obligation of mandatory interpretation.
139 
Indeed, this may 
be one of the reasons why the Court largely did not follow the AG in her reasoning. Still, 
her deeply reflective argumentation was not completely disregarded either: 
 
The Commission’s leading role, firmly anchored in the 
system of Regulation No 1/2003, in framing European 
competition policy would be undermined if the 
authorities and courts of the Member States simply 
ignored a competition policy notice issued by the 
Commission. It therefore follows from the duty of 
sincere cooperation which applies to all the Member 
States [Art. 10 EC, now Art. 4.3 TEU] that the national 
authorities and courts must take due account of the 
Commission’s competition policy notices, such as 
the de minimis notice, when exercising their powers 




As discussed above, in paragraph 37 of the Expedia judgment, the CJEU hesitantly took 





This section presented the legal effects of competition soft law vis-à-vis the European 
Commission and the European and national judiciary. It also showed that the CJEU is 
prepared to acknowledge indirect legal effects of soft instruments in domains such as state 
                                            
138 Expedia Inc., CJEU Case C–226/11 at para. 5. 
139
 SENDEN, supra note 9, at 406-7. 
140 Expedia Inc., CJEU Case C–226/11 at para. 38. 
141 Id. at para. 37. 
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aid that are related to the field of competition law.
142
 Finally, the supranational judicial 
practice has been far more resistant to accept the legal effects of competition soft law. 
While explanations for that result were acknowledged, it is maintained that, in line with a 
more flexible view on law presented in Section B above, and as argued by AG Kokott, 
ignoring competition soft instruments judicially—at the national or supranational level—
will have serious negative repercussions for the current design of EU competition 
enforcement. In this sense, recognizing legal effects of competition soft law at the national 
level—without endowing it with incidental binding force—is a much needed development.  
 
The next section will examine the array of plausible national judicial responses to 
competition soft law. It acknowledges the possibility of formalist judicial rejection of 
engaging with competition soft law but does not discuss this at length due to this 
outcome’s dissonance with the flexible theoretical underpinnings of the current Article.
143
 
Thus, the following section will first deal with the possibility of competition soft law in 
national courts to generate indirect legal effects via the intermediation of general 
principles of law.
144
 Then, the section will propose a second option for judicial recognition 
of competition soft law, not based on the idea of indirect legal effects.
145
 These two 
approaches constitute judicial “recognition” of soft law. 
 
D. Theoretical Possibilities for Recognition of Soft Law as an Instrument That Produces 
Legal Effects 
 
The largely dismissive attitude towards competition soft law discernible in supranational 
judicial practice is unfortunate, as it fails to provide the system of decentralized 
competition enforcement with certainty regarding the future application of rules. Not only 
do judgments currently militate against the general principle of legal certainty, which is 
alarming even from a formalist point of view, they also unsurprisingly prove undesirable in 
light of the premises of more flexible theories on the role of the judiciary in a new 
governance context, in which competition soft law exists.  
 
Before engaging with flexible accounts on judicial activity that are open to the idea of 
judicial recognition of soft law, it needs to be emphasized that the above theoretical 
presumption that the national judiciary could adopt a formalist stance towards 
competition soft law and refuse to engage with it, although normatively undesirable, is 
                                            
142 With regard to state aid soft law, the previous section, see, infra Section C.II, showed that incidental binding 
force has also been accepted by the courts. 
143 This is why in the introductory definition of “judicial recognition,” the formalist possibility for the courts to 
“refuse to interpret soft law,” is not foreseen.  
144 See, infra Section D.I. 
145 See, infra Section D.II. 
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nevertheless - according to the author - quite plausible to materialize in practice. The 
extent to which this presumption holds up in practice, however, has to be ascertained 




to judicial activity acknowledge the pivotal importance 
of courts as catalysts of new power relations in the multi-level EU regulatory space. They 
maintain that courts are a “concrete location where new governance and law must be 
reconciled”
147
 by way of ensuring full and fair participation of actors involved in new 
governance processes, securing the adequacy of the “epistemic or information base for 
decision-making within new governance,”
148
 and requiring transparency and accountability 
as essential elements of enforceability. 
 
As previously laid out, by adopting a light-touch, near dismissive and largely formalist 
approach to competition soft law, supranational judicial discourse has so far failed to send 
an unambiguous signal on the contents of the information base on which administrative 
and national judicial decision-making should take place. This attitude—with the hesitant 
exception of Expedia—is liable to trump the crucial judicial role as delineated by Scott and 
Sturm: “[C]ourts asked to review the adequacy of new governance decisions are not 
merely assessing the outputs of those bodies; they are signaling the benchmarks for 
normative activity in these other domains, thus influencing how normative activity will 




The reasoning of the supranational judiciary could be explained, however, by the 
judicialization theory of Stone Sweet, whose assumption is that in situations of novelty, 
judges “behave defensively, . . . they struggle, in decision-making processes, to protect 
themselves from charges of usurpation.”
150 
The same attitude seemingly lies at the 
foundations of the phenomenon of “ignored governance” observed by Scott and Trubek.
151 
They claim EU courts ignore governance at times and instead tend to draw “formal lines of 
authority . . . without even the barest of reference to the social reality of partnership or 
                                            
146 See generally, Alec Stone-Sweet, The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance, 5 (2) 
LIVING REVS. IN EUR. GOVERNANCE 5 (2010). See also, Scott & Sturm, supra note 36, at 566–67. 
147 Scott & Sturm, supra note 36, at 566. 
148 Id. at 567. 
149 Id. at 570. The same observation is also made by Stone-Sweet, supra note 132, at 117. 
150 Alec Stone-Sweet, Constitutional Politics: The Reciprocal Impact of Lawmaking and Constitutional Adjudication, 
in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 111 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998). 
151 Joanne Scott and David Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 
8 (1) EUR. L. J. 1, 11 (2002). 
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engagement with its implications for law.”
152
 Judicial refusal to engage with new 
governance in its different guises, and competition soft law in particular, is a missed 
opportunity to direct the recently revamped regulatory domain of competition in a time 
when new rules need to be contextualized and endowed with new normative existence.
153 
Still, as argued above, there are good reasons for the cautious approach of European 
courts. In addition to their traditional resistance to novelty, courts also consider other 
elements curbing their ambit of action, such as the vast discretion of the Commission to 
set the rules of competition.
154
 The current normative confusion in the competition 
regulatory space is nevertheless highly undesirable, especially in light of the above-
mentioned principle of legal certainty and the implications its non-observance could have 
for the subjects of the law in the recently decentralized system. 
 
National courts, enabled by Regulation 1/2003 to directly apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
in their entirety, will, to a large extent, decide the fate of the Modernization process.
155
 
This Article will now hypothesize as to the possible responses to competition soft law that 
national courts might have. National courts might either be resistant, as Scott and Trubek 
suggest, or, conversely, explicitly engage with soft law by using legal techniques to give 
indirect legal effect to non-binding provisions as discussed by Senden and Stefan.
156
 Finally, 
national courts could be persuaded by the substantive content of competition soft law, 
                                            
152 Id. Scott and Trubek also detect instances at which governance had been (1) thwarted—in the instances where 
the CJEU had insisted that Directives creating rights and obligations for individuals be transposed as hard 
legislation only—(2) distorted—an artificial concept is created in order to enable the output of a new governance 
process to be interpreted in light of general principles of community law—or (3) taken seriously—when 
interpreting the concept of representativeness as a democratically legitimating feature of the process of 
lawmaking. It is possible that national courts also exhibit similar attitudes to competition soft law in their first 
direct interactions with it. 
153 Stone-Sweet discusses the high stakes involved in novel lawmaking in the following way: “At this first stage 
governments and parliaments enjoy wide policy-making discretion, but face high constitutional uncertainty.” This 
constitutional uncertainty is according to the current author unfortunately not tackled by the CJEU when it comes 
to the issue of competition soft law. Stone-Sweet, supra note 151, at 114. 
154 The large discretion of the Commission to develop competition policy is based on the “exclusive EU 
competence” status of the policy domain and is further confirmed by the supranational courts in their judgments 
in the field. The rule by which both the CJEU and General Court abide in the domain of competition law is “judicial 
deference” to the decisions of the European Commission, because those largely involve matters of complex 
economic assessment. See Nicholas Forwood, The Commission’s More Economic Approach: Implications for the 
Role of the EU Courts, the Treatment of Economic Evidence and the Scope of Judicial Review, in EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2009: EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE AND ITS JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPETITION CASES, 255, 259 (Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2010).  
155 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002 on The Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid 
Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, 1. 
156 See, supra Section C. 
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whereby they would incorporate its reasoning in judicial discourse without explicit 




The following section will proceed by charting out in greater detail the latter two 
possibilities for judicial recognition of competition soft law at the national level. The 
formalist resistant judiciary scenario will not be addressed for reasons outlined above. 
 
I. Explicit Treatment of Competition Soft Law in National Judicial Discourse: General 
Principles of Law 
 
In the instances where courts take soft law “seriously,”
158 
they engage in interpretation of 
technically non-legal instruments by application of general principles of law to them. This 
happens in two ways, as Tridimas testifies: “Recourse to general principles as a source of 
law may be made by a court either as a result of express reference contained in a legal text 
or spontaneously by the court itself in order to fill a gap in written law.”
159 
In other words, 
in order for general principles to become relevant, the soft guidelines, notices, and the like 
should contain explicit in-text references to general principles of law; alternatively, it is up 
to the courts to raise an issue of general principles ex officio. 
 
The latter situation is quite unlikely, however, because courts are naturally cautious to 
engage with atypical instruments, as discussed above.
160
 Therefore, for the second 
scenario to materialize, it is largely up to the parties to the proceedings to raise arguments 
regarding the applicability of general principles.
161 
Literature on the matter discussed 
above
162
 showed that, out of the general principles of law applicable to the competition 
domain, the principles most likely to be invoked are those of legal certainty and the 
pertinent legitimate expectations, community loyalty, and equality. The ability of these 
                                            
157 Gormsen in the context of the Art. 102 guidelines (and the methodology for conditional rebates laid down 
therein), expresses the opinion that the CJEU could have taken the relevant provisions into consideration had it 
thought of them as enunciating a sensible approach. Gormsen, supra note 106, at 238. 
158 The expression used by Scott & Trubek is “engage seriously with new governance”; we allow ourselves the 
freedom to supplant the term “new governance” for “soft law” because the latter is an expression or instrument 
of the former. See Scott & Trubek, supra note 151, at 12. 
159 TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 9.  
160 See, supra Section C.II. 
161 Miasik Contends that, “Another way of applying general principles in judicial practice is to refer to them in 
order to inspire the judiciary to interpret [national] law in a manner compatible with a particular principle . . . the 
more applicants raise issues of general principles of law in their submissions to courts, the more valuable 
judgments dealing with those principles will be delivered.” See Dawid Miasik, Application of General Principles of 
EC Law by Polish Courts—Is the European Court of Justice Receiving a Positive Feedback?, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
EC LAW IN A PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT, 357, 382, 391 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds., 2008). 
162 See, supra Section C. 
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three principles to endow competition soft law with legal effects—if invoked by parties to 
the proceedings or ex officio—is discussed below. 
 
1. “Spontaneous” Use of General Principles of Law  
 
1.1 Legitimate Expectations and Legal Certainty 
 
The principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations are so interwoven that 
sometimes even the CJEU does not distinguish between them.
163
 Scholars do agree that 
the latter is a more specific expression of the former
164
 and could thus be a source of 





It is commonly agreed that the principle of protection of legitimate expectations is inspired 
by the German principle of Vertrauensschutz—a principle that the national courts saw as 
underlying certain provisions of the German basic law.
166
 The principle entered the EU 
domain via Topfer
167
 and has since become quite relevant for the competition domain. As 
Tridimas reasons, legal certainty acquires particular importance in economic law due to the 
very nature of economic relations and transactions: “Economic and commercial life is 
based on advance planning so that clear and precise legal provisions reduce transaction 
costs and promote efficient business. Legal certainty may thus be seen as contributing to 




It is precisely on these desiderata that the current EU competition regime fails. In order to 
secure more legal certainty for the system, one must make sure that the subjects of the 
law will be able to claim legitimate expectations, which appears to be quite problematic in 
the competition domain. This is the case because legitimate expectations can rarely
169 
be 
                                            
163 TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 163; USHER, supra note 93, at 52–71; Raitio, supra note 127, at 54. 
164 HOFMANN, supra note 92, at 162; USHER, supra note 93, at 52. For a more detailed discussion of the difference, 
see TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 170. 
165 TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 170. 
166 John Usher, General Principles and National Law—A Continuing Two-Way Process, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC 
LAW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT, 393, 402 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds., 2008). 
167 August Töpfer & Co. GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities, CJEU Case C–112/77, 1978 E.C.R. 
01019.  
168 TRIDIMAS, surpa note 8, at 163. For a similar argument, see also Raitio, supra note 126, at 59. 
169 It is submitted by Raitio that, “The principle of legitimate expectations is primarily applicable to individual 
decisions, but it may in limited cases apply to the exercise of a more general power and thus to the EU legislation 
as well.” Raitio, supra note 126, at 54. 
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based solely on the content of existing legislation—let alone soft law. Rather, they must be 
derived from consistent administrative or judicial practice.
170
 The current state of EU 
Competition Law, however, seems to exemplify inconsistency at the levels of both 
administrative and judicial practice. 
171 
This state of flux is to a large extent due to the 
entirely different substantive and procedural rules of competition introduced in Regulation 





Thankfully, the case law on legitimate expectations does take into account the possibility 
of changes to the status quo and allows claims under abnormal circumstances to stand.
173
 
In that regard, legitimate expectations may be invoked against the Commission when there 
has been a substantial and long-lasting dialogue between the applicant and the institution, 
including the requirement that “the applicant must have acted on the expectation (or have 
refrained from taking some action which it would otherwise have taken): [M]ere hopes in 
the continuance of the status quo are not sufficient to found a legitimate expectation.”
174
 
Thus, it is possible for an individual to claim legitimate expectations against the Community 
with regard to a Community instrument affecting his rights and obligations that he 
detrimentally relied on, including soft law. 
 
1.2 Community Loyalty: Article 4.3 TEU 
  
Section C above argued that the principle of legitimate expectations, paired with that of 
community loyalty,
175
 could prove successful in inducing legal effect of competition soft 
instruments. Although legitimate expectations in and of themselves might already be 
sufficient to this effect, it is necessary to emphasize the strength of community loyalty as a 
                                            
170 See, among others, Joined Cases Compagnie Industrielle Et Agricole Du Comté De Loheac and Others v. Council 
and Commission, CJEU Cases 54–60/76, 1997 E.C.R. I–00645; Mulder v. Minister Van Landbouw En Visserij, CJEU 
Case C–120/86, 1988 E.C.R. 02321; Von Deetzen v. HZA Hamburg-Jonas, CJEU Case C–170/86, 1988 E.C.R. 02355. 
171 This problem is most acute in the abuse of dominance field under Art. 102 as noted by Gormsen, supra note 
106, and numerous others. 
172 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002 on The Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid 
Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1, 1. 
173 See Sharpston, supra note 20, at 110–12. 
174 Id. at 142. 
175 Community loyalty cannot create duties on its own but only together with another rule of community law or 
principle or objective of community policy which is to be promoted; the latter also needs to be sufficiently and 
precisely defined. See John Temple-Lang, Art. 10 EC—The Most Important “General Principle” of Community Law, 
in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT, 75, 79, 86, 88 (Ulf Bernitz et al. eds., 2008). There 
are, however, signals that this situation might be changing in the future. Id. at 85.  
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mainly procedural principle, mediating the importance of more substantive principles of 
EU law, such as legitimate expectations.
176  
 
The principle enshrined in Article 4.3 TEU acquires its importance at the Member State 
level, whereby it imposes (1) a positive obligation on Member States to comply with 
community law, (2) a negative obligation on Member States not to jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of Community law, and (3) an obligation for mutual 
cooperation between the national and supranational levels. The last sub-category is, in the 
words of Gormley, “[T]he key to the proper functioning of the relationship between the 
Commission and national courts in the fields of competition and state aids.”
177
 In 
particular, Gormley refers to the relevant notices which secure the proper cooperation 
between the said institutions
178
 and which, in this respective function, silently incorporate 
the principle of community loyalty.
179 
 
Both the notices and the principle of community loyalty acquired even greater significance 
for the EU competition regime after its decentralization with Regulation 1/2003, since, 
with respect to competition, every national court is now also a Community court. This 
allows the principle of Article 4.3 TEU to enter the domain of private law because it 
“imposes on public authorities and courts the duty to respect and when necessary to 
protect . . . the Community law rights of individuals and companies, including their rights 




According to Temple-Lang, Article 4.3 TEU obliges Member States to promote competition 
in general, and Community competition law in particular, via their competent authorities 
and thus to achieve the results provided for by the EU competition framework.
181 
To this 
                                            
176 Temple-Lang states that community loyalty is “the most important of the general principles because it is the 
legal basis of the obligation on all national courts and authorities to comply with all other general principles.” In 
this regard, it cannot stand on its own and needs to be always used together with another general principle, the 
latter defining the scope of application of the former. Id. at 77. 
177 Gormley, supra note 123, at 312. 
178 Commission Notice on the Co-Operation between the Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States in 
the Application of Arts. 81 and 82 EC of 27 Apr. 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 101/04); Commission Notice on the 
Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts of 9 Apr. 2009, 2009 O.J. (C 85/01). 
179 This is in line with Temple-Lang’s argument that community loyalty is an underlying consideration of a vast 
array of Community actions, although the principle is usually not explicitly mentioned. See generally, Temple-
Lang, supra note 175. 
180 Temple-Lang, supra note 175, at 90, 97. The author submits that Community law is gradually developing a 
concept of laws which protect private rights and requiring these rights to be protected, when necessary, under 
Art. 4.3 TEU; this process, however, when fuelled by judicial output (case law), is slow, incremental and 
uncoordinated. 
181 Id. at 101. 
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end, Temple-Lang mentions several duties for promotion of competition, such as offering 
legal aid to claimants relying on EU competition law, striving for full compensation of 
victims of a competition law breach and the related adoption of presumption of harm 
when it is excessively difficult for the claimant to prove it. It is here that the above-
proposed link between community loyalty and the general good faith principle becomes 
most obvious. These duties are procedural in nature, however. It would be equally 
interesting to know whether the Article 4.3 TEU principle also applies with regard to the 
achievement of substantive results envisioned in the soft law instruments that constitute 
the rules of the competition regulatory framework. A significant number of scholars submit 
that community loyalty alone is too general of a principle to create specific duties.
182 
This is 
also why it was suggested above
183
 that community loyalty could be successfully paired 
with the principle of legitimate expectations, which is more concrete in its application. 
 
Prominent scholars like Klabbers and Everling opine to the contrary—they believe that 
community loyalty is,
184
 or is evolving towards,
185
 a self-standing principle of EU law 
capable of creating specific legal duties. This latter scenario is not unimaginable, especially 
in light of Temple-Lang’s contention that community loyalty is a principle with an often 
neglected substantive dimension,
186
 and especially with regard to private damages actions 
in national courts.
187
 In order to test these theoretical views with respect to competition 





Equality, or the principle of non-discrimination, emerged out of the early EEC Treaty 
articles which prohibited difference in treatment with regard to nationality, international 
taxation of goods, pay for men and women, and agricultural markets.
188 
It is relevant for all 
                                            
182 See generally, Gormley, supra note 123; SENDEN, supra note 9; STEFAN, supra note 2. The principle could, 
however, produce a duty at least to motivate deviation from soft law provisions as advocated by AG Kokkot in her 
Expedia opinion. Expedia Inc., CJEU Case C–226/11. 
183 See, supra Section D.I.1.b. 
184
 Klabbers, by citing Everling, endorses the view that Art. 10 EC might be just enough to give legal effect to soft 
law in view of the instruments’ “meaning within the context of the integration process at large and the goals of 
the Treaty in particular.” Klabbers, supra note 64, at 1016. 
185 See Temple-Lang, supra note 175, at 85. 
186 Id. at 111. 
187 Id. at 101. 
188 USHER, supra note 93, at 12. 
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fields of EU activity, with a particular importance for EU economic law,
189
 and ensures that 
authorities apply the law equally to all citizens in the same position (formal equality), and 
that the content of these laws does not discriminate on arbitrary grounds between groups 
of peoples (substantive equality). 
 
This principle binds EU institutions and Member States when they act within the scope of 
EU law and can also, in the context of EU competition law, bind natural and legal 
persons.
190 
These categories of applicants are thus entitled to invoke the principle in 
competition proceedings at the national level. National courts deciding disputes based on 
EU competition rules may also be compelled to refer to soft law because those instruments 
inform the substantive content of the hard competition regulatory framework. Therefore, 
to ensure formal equality,
191 
soft law must be taken into account explicitly, by the use of 




Furthermore, the principle of equality of treatment has been associated with legal 
certainty in the case law of the CJEU.
193
 This Article thus argues that, much like in the case 
of community loyalty, equality might be paired with legal certainty and the pertaining 
legitimate expectations in order to give legal effect to otherwise non-binding competition 
law instruments. 
 
2. General Principles of Law Expressly Incorporated in the Text of Soft Law Instruments 
 
In her dissertation on the treatment of soft law in courts, Stefan argues that it is more 
likely that the judiciary engages with guidelines if they contain in-text references to general 
principles of law.
194
 In the context of competition law, she maintains that the courts and 
the Commission engage in a “dialogue” with regard to soft law, mutually accepting each 




                                            
189 TRIDIMAS, supra note 8, at 43, 45. In EU competition law, the principle of equality is seen as underlying the very 
basic premise of undistorted competition. 
190 Id. at 44. 
191 Formal equality is what EU economic integration (including the internal market and competition policies) 
strives to achieve. See DE BURCA &CRAIG, supra note 112, at 605. 
192 See, infra Section D.II. 
193 Raymond Louwage and Marie-Thérèse Louwage, Née Moriame, v. Commission of the European Communities, 
CJEU Case C–48/73, 1974 E.C.R. 00081.  
194
 STEFAN (note 2), 220–21. 
195 Id. at 219–25. The case of Expedia may serve as a recent example thereof. See Expedia Inc., CJEU C–226/11. 
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In this line of thinking, relevant passages of case law that refer to general principles of law 
are “inserted in new soft law being made at Commission level and then back again in new 
judgments of EU courts, completing a virtuous circle.”
196
 The CJEU is thus willing to discuss 
non-binding law when it incorporates and serves general principles of law. 
 
Such a development is hardly surprising if one makes a parallel with the recent CJEU case 
law in the field of non-implemented Directives – the Mangold judgment
197 
and others 
produced in its aftermath.
198
 The importance of both the Mangold and the subsequent 
Kucukdeveci judgment lies in their assertion that a non-implemented Directive that cannot 
formally influence the legal situation as between private parties can nevertheless be 
deemed to do so by the Court if it explicitly mentions and serves the attainment of general 
principles of higher, constitutional order—namely, the principle of equal treatment in its 
guise of non-discrimination on the basis of age.
199
 Although both the aforementioned cases 
concern themselves with hard law —a non-implemented Directive—the similarity with soft 
law lies in the fact that both categories of instruments (soft law and non-implemented 
Directives) cannot directly produce legal effects at the national level and can thus not be 
the source of rights and obligations for individuals.
200
 But, as demonstrated by these 
judgments, this situation can be changed in case the instruments in question incorporate 
general principles of law (of constitutional significance) and are, by virtue of this fact, held 




                                            
196 STEFAN, supra note 2, at 201-25. 
197 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, CJEU Case C–144/04, 2005 E.C.R. I-09981.  
198 Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG., CJEU Case C–555/07, 2010 E.C.R. I-00365. 
199 Dagmar Schiek, The ECJ Decision in Mangold: A Further Twist on Effects of Directives and Constitutional 
Relevance of Community Equality Legislation, 35 (3) INDUS. L. J., 329, 333 (2006). 
200  As a matter of EU Law (Article 288 TFEU), a Directive needs to be first implemented at the national level in 
order to produce legal effects and to be a source of rights and obligations for parties. Thus, a non-implemented 
Directive cannot create rights and obligations until implemented. In the period between adoption and 
implementation, however, Member States’ bodies are obliged not to take measures which might work counter to 
the objectives of the Directive. See Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région wallonne, CJEU Case C–129/96, 
1997 E.C.R. I-7411. For soft law, the only formal obligation that national organs have is to take utmost account of 
those instruments, following Grimaldi.  
201 For an argument that Mangold is actually not a case where horizontal direct effect of Directives was further 
confirmed, see Schiek, supra note 199, at 337. Schiek argues that, “a Directive . . . having direct effect on a 
legislative activity that impacts on horizontal relations is not the same as a directive having horizontal effect 
itself.” While the argument is technically correct, the ultimate result of the judgment is nevertheless to create a 
situation in which the rights and obligations of two private parties (employer and employee) are de facto 
impacted by the non-implemented Directive in question. 
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II. Implicit Treatment of Competition Soft Law in National Judicial Discourse: The 
“Persuaded Judiciary” Scenario 
 
The persuaded judiciary theory provides the possibility of engaging with the substantive 
content of soft law implicitly, without relying on the mechanism of indirect legal effects. 
This scenario may materialize when courts want to signal that they agree with the 
substance of a soft law instrument, but do so by alluding to its content rather than 
explicitly referencing the instrument proper. 
 
This theory builds on the phenomenon of “legal legitimacy” as conceptualized by 
Finnemore and Toope.
202
 The idea of legal legitimacy is that courts might slip in arguments 
indirectly upholding soft law when the latter instruments are both internally—by virtue of 
their ‘nature’—and externally persuasive—towards subjects of the law and institutions. 
This happens, for instance, when soft law instruments are sufficiently clear and precise and 
have been adopted on the basis of broad agreement,
203
 involving a majority of relevant 
stakeholders who exercise pressure on the legal system through perceiving competition 
soft law as legitimate law and thus aligning their behavior to its provisions. 
 
The phenomenon here highly resembles the account of Frederick Schauer on judicial 
learning from—as opposed to following—precedent:  
 
With respect to the former . . . the instant court may 
learn from a previous case, or be persuaded by some 
decision in the past, but the decision to do what 
another court has done on an earlier occasion is not 




By the same token, the decision of a national court to follow competition soft law is not 
based on the latter’s status as law, but on its persuasive force stemming from what 




Additionally, subjects of the law are themselves on both the input and the receiving ends 
of soft rules. On the one hand, the perceived legal legitimacy of soft rules fuels the 
persuasion process by which courts will engage with the latter; on the other hand, once 
courts have signaled their attitude, it is again up to the subjects of the law to pick up on 
                                            
202 Finnemore & Toope, supra note 24, at 743. 
203 Here we refer to the possibility of multi-party agreement secured at public consultations preceding the 
adoption of competition soft law. 
204 SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 38. 
205 Finnemore & Toope, supra note 24, at 749. 
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this signal and complete what appears to be an iterative cycle not unlike the one Scott and 
Sturm as well as Stefan suggest.
206
 Consequently, the success of this method of judicial 
recognition will depend on the actors of the system being able to pick the relevant signals 
coming from the judiciary and on the judiciary not totally rejecting engagement with soft 
law in the first place. 
 
This section, in line with a more flexible approach to law, proposed several theoretical 
possibilities for the judicial acknowledgment of competition soft law at national level, 
while still acknowledging formalist arguments pointing towards rejection of judicial 
engagement with the latter instruments. It distinguished between explicit and implicit 
recognition of soft law, the former being possible through the creation of indirect legal 
effects by the intermediation of general principles of law, and the latter through the 




This Article focuses on studying competition soft instruments as instruments of law for the 
purposes of establishing the theoretical possibility of their recognition in national judicial 
discourse. The core idea, therefore, asserts that a legal dimension to competition soft law 
should be judicially acknowledged—in line with a flexible view of law—in order to ensure 
the functioning of a decentralized competition enforcement system governed by legal 
certainty and substantive coherence in legal outcomes. In the process of judicial 
recognition, however, one should keep in mind that soft law does not directly transform 
into hard law as hypothesized by formalist international legal scholars. To the contrary—
and in line with the flexible view—soft law generates legal effects when subject to judicial 
scrutiny, while remaining soft as an instrument. 
 
In order to further delineate those legal effects, a theoretical framework was devised. On 
the basis of a study of academic work on judicial attitudes to soft law and the current 
practice of the supranational European courts, it was hypothesized that national courts 
could acknowledge the legal effects of competition soft law by either: (a) Employing 
general principles of law ex officio or upon a request of a party to the proceedings, or (b) 
employing general principles of law because the latter are expressly mentioned—as 
objectives to be fulfilled—by the soft instrument under review. Within the limits of the 
same theoretical framework, it was also argued that courts could slip in arguments 
borrowed from soft law in their judicial discourse because they are “persuaded” of the 
merits of the point that a soft instrument makes. Finally, this study remains wary of the 
fact that courts could be unreceptive to soft law and, following a formalistic stance, deny 
engagement with it in their judicial practice. 
                                            
206 Scott & Sturm, supra note 36, at 570–75. See also STEFAN, supra note 2, at 219–25. 
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